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# HPE SHADOWBASE TECHNICAL ARCHITECTURE OVERVIEW FOR DIGITAL RESILIENCE (MALWARE AND RANSOMWARE PREVENTION)

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May 2023



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# HPE SHADOWBASE ARCHITECTURES FOR MALWARE AND RANSOMWARE

Agenda - Protect, avoid, identify, and resolve

#### Key technology trends and challenges

#### Malware and Ransomware – general comments

#### Shadowbase architectures for ransomware recovery

- Ransomware Solution Architecture #1 Replication Connected via QMGR Files (non air-gapped)
- Ransomware Solution Architecture #2 Air-gapped, Immutable Data
- Ransomware additional comments

#### Malware – new architectures for mission-critical applications

- Shadowbase validation architectures for malware prevention
- Election/balloting application Proof of Concept (POC)

#### Stuff we won't have time for (sorry!)

- Shadowbase compare technologies
- Shadowbase malware and ransomware data recovery tools

#### Summary

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# **KEY TECHNOLOGY TRENDS AND CHALLENGES**



# **KEY TECHNOLOGY TRENDS AND CHALLENGES**

Look to HPE Shadowbase to help solve them

#### • Digital resiliency

- Protection, detection, containment, recovery and repair capabilities against information and communication technology (ICT) related incidents
- $\,\circ\,$  Government regulations are underway

#### Malware and Ransomware protection

- $\circ$  Global business concern
- New approaches (e.g., "immutable" backups and "air-gapped" systems)
- Value of TMF-audited applications and data cannot be overstated



![](_page_4_Picture_10.jpeg)

![](_page_4_Picture_11.jpeg)

![](_page_4_Picture_12.jpeg)

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# **HPE SHADOWBASE**

Malware and Ransomware – general comments

# MALWARE AND RANSOMWARE (1)

General comments

- **1.** Know your Enemy: *Malware* and *Ransomware* are not (quite) the same thing!
  - a) **Malware** is essentially software that is specifically designed to disrupt, damage, or gain unauthorized access to a computer system (Source: Dictionary.com)
  - **b) Ransomware** is essentially a type of malicious software designed to block access to a computer system until a sum of money is paid (Source: Dictionary.com)
- 2. However, we categorize ransomware as a <u>type</u> of malware, noting the protections for each are different but intersecting
- 3. Gravic is focused on protecting your <u>data</u> when it comes to malware and ransomware detection, prevention, and recovery
  - a) However, additional techniques will be needed to protect the application environment, network, personnel, etc.
- 4. Gravic's approach: prevent the malware or ransomware from working/operating; and if it occurs, detect it and terminate it immediately before it can do (more) harm
  - a) And, we have the tools to help you recover corrupted data

# MALWARE AND RANSOMWARE (2)

General comments

- 5. Shadowbase data replication cannot spread ransomware "programs"
  - a) Shadowbase data replication does <u>not</u> replicate object code or programs
  - b) Hence, data replication will not spread malware or ransomware object code, programs, libraries, DLL's, modules, etc
- 6. <u>File</u> Replication via backup/restore, PAK/UNPAK, FTP, HPE AutoSYNC, etc. can spread malware or ransomware programs
- 7. Data replication is, however, susceptible to a malware or malicious hacker attack that corrupts or encrypts specific record fields or table columns
  - a) These attacks are the focus of the <u>new</u> **Gravic Labs Shadowbase Validation Architecture (VA)** for immediate avoidance/detection and resolution (discussed later)
- 8. We will first look at existing SB architectures to assist with **Ransomware recovery**

**Note**: malware that just "monitors" and stealthily culls info is still a challenge and requires additional measures such as *monitoring for unauthorized outbound traffic, fingerprinting all programs, etc* 

![](_page_7_Figure_10.jpeg)

# **HPE SHADOWBASE**

Ransomware Solution Architecture #1 – replication connected via QMGR files (non air-gapped solution)

![](_page_8_Picture_2.jpeg)

#### SHADOWBASE REPLICATION TECHNOLOGY (1)

NonStop server to NonStop server – QMGR fed on target <u>Ransomware Remediation System (RRS)</u>

![](_page_9_Figure_2.jpeg)

System \PROD or \DR

#### System \RRS

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## SHADOWBASE REPLICATION TECHNOLOGY (2)

NonStop server to NonStop server – QMGR fed on target Ransomware Remediation System (RRS)

![](_page_10_Figure_2.jpeg)

#### Direct feed to RRS QMGR (RRS is not air-gapped):

- When attack occurs, start Consumers and optionally load target database
- Then replay queued change data to bring the target database current to a particular point in time
- Continue application processing on RRS, preserving original environment for forensic analysis

![](_page_10_Figure_7.jpeg)

System \PROD or \DR

#### System \RRS

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# **HPE SHADOWBASE**

Ransomware Solution Architecture #2 – air-gapped, immutable data

![](_page_11_Picture_2.jpeg)

#### **SHADOWBASE REPLICATION TECHNOLOGY (1)**

NonStop server to NonStop Server – QMGR on source side (air-gapped target) – Step 1

![](_page_12_Figure_2.jpeg)

#### System \PROD or \DR

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# SHADOWBASE REPLICATION TECHNOLOGY (2)

NonStop server to NonStop/SBOS platforms – QMGR on source side (air-gapped target) – Step 2

![](_page_13_Figure_2.jpeg)

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### SHADOWBASE REPLICATION TECHNOLOGY (3)

NonStop server to NonStop/SBOS platforms – QMGR on source side (air-gapped target) – Step 3

![](_page_14_Figure_2.jpeg)

# HPE SHADOWBASE

Malware and Ransomware – Additional Comments

# MALWARE AND RANSOMWARE (1)

Additional comments

#### 1. The RRS does not replace a proper DR target environment – it is a new isolated environment (best practice)

a) Ideally, the RRS is managed by an independent 3<sup>rd</sup> party (for example, Greenlake)

#### 2. Where should the Shadowbase QMGR queue files be stored?

- a) Source side vs target side? Customer choice...
- b) On NonStop disk or on immutable storage? Customer choice...

#### 3. Where should the Shadowbase QMGR queue files be fed from?

- a) From the Production source system? Customer choice...
- b) From the DR system? Customer choice...
- 4. On the NonStop, TMF-audited data is your first line of defense!
  - a) TMF guarantees <u>all</u> database changes are logged into an audit trail, and this can be used for recovery!
  - b) Non-audited data does not have these same advantages, capabilities, nor protection

![](_page_16_Figure_13.jpeg)

# MALWARE AND RANSOMWARE (2)

Additional comments

- 5. Shadowbase QMGRs provide some unique capabilities to fight ransomware and malware
  - a) They can selectively replay the change data from the queue files into the target database to bring it current, or to roll-itbackward to a particular point in time before the corruption occurred
  - b) Shadowbase can detect man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attacks between its key processes as IPC's are fingerprinted
  - c) The Shadowbase queue files are fingerprinted/validated (queue file tampering or corruption will be detected by Shadowbase before replay)
- 6. Shadowbase replication can also replicate/queue replicated data on non-NonStop target systems!
  - a) Our customers build "data vaults" on non-NonStop target systems this way
  - b) This data can be optionally replayed into a target database, or just stored there for safe keeping
  - c) We support Linux, Unix, Windows, IBM, and cloud environments as targets...as well as a host of common/popular target databases including Oracle, SQL Server, DB2, SAP Hana, SAP Sybase, MySQL, PostgreSQL, flat-files, and others

![](_page_17_Picture_10.jpeg)

# HPE NONSTOP SHADOWBASE

Ransomware defense and recovery utility solutions

- Shadowbase Compare & Repair
- Shadowbase Data Recovery Utilities (REDO, UNDO)

Sorry, not enough time to review these now...Visit the Gravic booth or contact us for more info  $\mathfrak{O}_{\ldots}$ 

![](_page_19_Picture_0.jpeg)

# Shadowbase Validation Architecture (VA)

New architectures from Gravic Labs to stop malware (and ransomware) in their tracks

### \*\*\* Future/Rapidly Evolving Technology \*\*\* Let's take a look at the VA deck!

![](_page_19_Picture_4.jpeg)

![](_page_19_Picture_6.jpeg)

# Validation Architectures to Improve Data Integrity

Redundant, independent processing

#### **Key properties**

- Applications active on all nodes
- Transactions are <u>duplicated</u> to all nodes
- Redundant processing of each transaction occurs at each node
- Validation of outcomes

# Key benefit

Optimized to maximize *Reliability & Data Integrity*

![](_page_20_Figure_9.jpeg)

![](_page_20_Picture_10.jpeg)

# **Validation Architectures**

Three Key Levels: 0, 1, and 2

- Level 0 Periodic Transaction Validation
- Level 1 Asynchronous Transaction Validation
- Level 2 Synchronous Transaction Validation

# All leverage a Transaction Duplicator ...which can be part of the application

![](_page_21_Figure_6.jpeg)

![](_page_21_Picture_7.jpeg)

![](_page_22_Figure_0.jpeg)

# Level 0: Periodic Transaction Validation

Transaction Duplicator to Two Separate Nodes

- Perform periodic database compares
- Use Shadowbase Compare to ensure data integrity

![](_page_22_Picture_5.jpeg)

![](_page_23_Figure_0.jpeg)

detection

features

2.

![](_page_24_Figure_0.jpeg)

# **Level 2: Synchronous Transaction Validation**

Transaction duplicator to two separate nodes

Like Level 1

- 1. Indicia is calculated and exchanged
- 2. Mismatches are detected and can trigger events
- 3. Provides real-time data integrity problem detection

*Plus*, when exchanging indicia (#1 above), each node votes on the outcome of the TMF transaction *before* the transaction is allowed to commit

# Prevents data integrity problems in real-time

![](_page_24_Picture_9.jpeg)

# Adding Continuous Availability to Validation Architectures

![](_page_25_Picture_1.jpeg)

# Dual Server (DSR) vs. Triple Server (TSR) Reliability

Validation architecture extension for improved availability and data integrity

![](_page_26_Figure_2.jpeg)

# Use Case POC

#### High integrity voting system

![](_page_27_Picture_2.jpeg)

![](_page_27_Picture_3.jpeg)

![](_page_28_Picture_0.jpeg)

#### **Preventing Election Fraud –** *Balloting GOLD Standard*

Solution: A voter-facing scanner uses Gravic software to 'score' the ballots

![](_page_28_Figure_3.jpeg)

![](_page_28_Picture_4.jpeg)

![](_page_29_Figure_0.jpeg)

![](_page_29_Picture_1.jpeg)

![](_page_30_Picture_0.jpeg)

#### Preventing Election Fraud – *Recent testing*...

**Ballot Tabulation Between Private and Public Clouds** 

![](_page_30_Figure_3.jpeg)

![](_page_30_Picture_4.jpeg)

# VA POC Video Overview

#### bit.ly/3LVN9d0: (3m:07s)

![](_page_31_Picture_2.jpeg)

![](_page_31_Picture_3.jpeg)

![](_page_32_Picture_0.jpeg)

![](_page_32_Picture_1.jpeg)

# **Sessions of Interest**

#### HPE Shadowbase – Digital Resilience, Data Integration, and Data Validation for HPE NonStop Systems Braemar Suite, Tuesday, 11:40 am – 12:10pm

#### Base24<sup>™</sup> ATM Active-Active Business Continuity with Shadowbase Software (Customer Talk!) Glamis Suite, Tuesday, 1:50pm – 2:20pm

#### Advanced Data Resiliency and Data Integrity Architectures for Mission Critical Servers

Braemar Suite, Wednesday, 11:40am – 12:10pm

#### Use HPE Shadowbase to Rapidly Extend HPE NonStop Databases and workloads to the Cloud

HPE In-Booth Demo

![](_page_32_Picture_9.jpeg)

![](_page_32_Picture_10.jpeg)

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![](_page_33_Picture_0.jpeg)

# Thank you!

SBProductManagement@Gravic.com

![](_page_33_Picture_3.jpeg)